Incorporating the 100,000 new purchases that arrived every day into the Netflix's inventory created its own operational challenges. In a 2005 interview, Tom Dillon, the company's Chief Operating Officer and Chief Information Officer until his retirement in January 2006, described how Netflix had reduced labor costs related to receiving by 50 percent -and he was aiming for 75 percent. "When the company first started up, the receiving clerk would pick up a box from the pallet, find the paperwork, and match the box with the purchase order. Now the receiver just slaps a label and bar code on the box, and the system automatically matches the code with the purchase order." 8 Netflix distributed its inventory across 41 mailing centers, although a large portion, 26 million discs out of the 42 million total, were housed in its original center near San Jose, California. 9 A 2002 article stated that Netflix's satellite centers deliberately maintained "zero inventory." It described the process in regional centers in 2002 as follows:
Discs not mailed out (about 300 DVDs per day) are temporarily stored on a wire shelving unit. All the unshipped DVDs fit inside one cardboard container. At the end of every week, any unused inventory is shipped back to the main distribution center in San Jose for storage." 10 Netflix introduced software in January 2003 that dramatically reduced shelf time. As discs were returned by customers, many were matched to a customer request list and shipped back out the same day. Discs that were not matched for customer send-out that day were not sorted and shelved. Instead, they were tossed into bins to be rescanned the following day. If a disc remained in a regional center for more than a few days, it was returned to the California warehouse. With this software, Netflix reduced labor costs by about 15 percent, and the vast majority of discs never touched the shelf before they went out again. 11 Although Netflix had to grow its DVD library to deliver titles to subscribers with minimum delays, outside estimations of Netflix's year-to-year inventory value were problematic, since Netflix changed its accounting methodology for valuing its DVD library several times. In its financial statements, Netflix showed its DVD library as a productive, non-current asset. In valuing inventory, Netflix considered the useful life (including utilization and loss and damage) of new release DVDs as one year, and back-catalog DVDs as three years. 12 For DVDs that it had purchased directly and expected to sell, Netflix estimated a salvage value of $3.00. For DVDs obtained through revenue sharing agreements, after a fixed period, usually a year, the disc was either returned to the studio, destroyed, or purchased by Netflix. 13 
Distribution Centers, 1.6 Million DVDs a Day -One Disc at a Time
From its inception, Netflix designed its service around post office procedures. By late 2006, Netflix was shipping more than 1.6 million DVDs a day, making it one of the post office's top ten customers for first-class mail. The company made fast turnaround part of its brand identity, and saw delivery under three days as essential to retaining customers. It had located its mail centers so that, by 2006, close to 90 percent of the U.S. population -and 90 percent of Netflix's customers -was within one-day delivery of its distribution centers, via first class mail. In January 2007, Netflix announced that it planned to reach 95 percent of customers with one-day service by the end of 2007, by adding nine additional mail centers and expanding its fleet of trucks to link those mail centers to an additional 50 regional post offices. 14 Netflix had initially focused on the San Francisco Bay Area, and still enjoyed its greatest market penetration there, with 15 percent of households subscribing. During the company's first three years, it had mailed all DVDs from its warehouse in the Silicon Valley near San Jose, and the Silicon Valley facility remained the largest, at 115,000 square feet. 15 The facility also housed the Netflix receiving and storage center, its customer service center, and the processing and shipping center for the San Francisco Bay Area. 16 As it had expanded nationwide, Netflix opened five to seven new centers each year. These satellite fulfillment centers were near post office distribution facilities in major metropolitan areas. They were typically around 8,000 square feet and employed eight to fifteen workers. 17 According to one source in 2003, the typical cost for setting up a center was $60,000. 18 All Netflix facilities were in rental spaces in lightly utilized industrial areas, so Netflix could adjust the size of centers to demand. 19 Netflix trucks picked up returned envelopes from regional postal centers early each weekday morning and delivered presorted envelopes in the evening, in time for next-day delivery. As employees in each fulfillment center opened returning envelopes, they scanned the bar code on each disc. Software then retrieved the name and address of the next person on the waiting list for that DVD and printed a label for mailing out that afternoon. The software also generated emails to customers as discs were scanned in and again as they were mailed out, and controlled the movement of discs as they were sorted, shipped to the next customer, or restocked into storage. 20 A 2003 PC Magazine article gave this description of the process:
An order placed by a customer in Manhattan will be assigned to the distribution center in nearby Flushing, New York. If the DVD is not available, the system will poll the nextclosest distribution center, in Stamford, Connecticut. If that center doesn't have it, the system contacts the next closest, and so on until the DVD is located (even if that means sending it from Netflix's main library in San Jose, California). If the disc is not found, the system will look for the customer's second choice back in Flushing. No matter where the disc is sent from, the system knows to print a return label to the Flushing facility to minimize return-mail times. 21 An August 2006 New Yorker article described a similar process at the Netflix mail center in Maryland, which provided new titles by Wednesday to customers who had mailed movies on Monday. The center received and sent out 126,000 discs on Tuesday, the busiest day of the week for returns. The 40 employees started at 6:30 A.M., each opening between 450 and 1,150 returned envelopes an hour. By 11:00 A.M. they had completed the cycle of opening each envelope, recycling the empty envelopes, and checking the titles, discs, and sleeves. After an hour for lunch, employees begin stuffing: inserting an outbound disc into an electronically addressed envelope, flipping the envelope closed, peeling a sticker strip, and pressing the envelope together. The fastest workers could stuff 1,000 mailers an hour. All workers joined in hourly ergonomic exercises to prevent repetitive motion injuries.
The envelopes then entered a machine that placed tabs closing a third side, at 6,000 an hour, and then placed the envelopes into one of four zip code sorters, which ran until 7:30 p.m. to complete the presort (presorted mail qualified for discounted postage fees). As the warehouse closed, a truck drove one mile to deliver the envelopes to the post office, which accepted presorted mail until 8:30 p.m. for next day delivery. 22 Netflix operations were adapted to post office sorting machinery as well as to post office procedures and schedules. In interviews, Reed Hastings's version of Netflix's creation story included a recounting of his purchasing several DVDs and mailing them to himself to see if they would survive. 25 Jim Cook, who built and managed financial and operational functions from the company's founding in 1997 until 1999, wrote about the effort that went into understanding post office operations. He noted that he had spent hundreds of hours in the largest regional postal centers. He realized that the high-spinning circular drums used to process standard-sized letters would destroy DVDs. However, he noticed a separate conveyer belt system that sorted larger pieces of "flat mail" that would work well for mailing DVDs. Cook wrote, I found out that if an envelope had certain dimensions and other characteristics, it would be sorted by this alternate system instead of the large, crushing metal drums. Better yet, this flat mail-sorting machine would read a bar coded delivery address and could automatically sort the item into "carrier walking route" sequence. Now the wheels were really turning. The fact that we could provide the right-size packaging, bar code, and other characteristics would make it possible for extremely fast processing of a mail piece with absolutely no human intervention or other physical touch. 26 With this knowledge, Netflix went on to design its patented mailer. Cook noted that "Above all else, this envelope was our 'product.' It was the only thing that our customers would touch and see. Therefore, it had to have all the key features of a great marketing piece." Cook described a number of additional criteria for the envelope:  It had to effectively hold and protect the DVD.

It had to meet stringent post office criteria so we could mail with the equivalent cost of a first-class stamp.
It had to transform into the return envelope, so that DVDs would find their way back to Netflix quickly and in good condition.
It had to be "operational" -easy to insert and remove the discs and something that could be pre-printed in mass quantities. 27 Years of experimentation went into creating the perfect DVD envelope for the post office and the customer -lightweight, recyclable, sturdy enough for the round trip, and efficiently loaded and sealed at a mail center and opened on its return. Cook described the evolution of envelope design:
Since 1998, there have been over 150 versions of this little red package. It wasn't always red, but we determined that red was the easiest color to see in the post office. It was not always paper thin -our first package was much thicker, and we shipped three DVDs in the same envelope. By testing, learning, and improving, we did such non-intuitive things as print the inside return address upside down to make processing more efficient. We had to build a mini "pocket" inside the package to ensure that the Post Office stamp-canceling machine wouldn't break the DVD inside. A very recent change added a little cut-out on the outside of the package, enabling one to check the disc in by "seeing" the inside disc barcode without having to open the package. The amount of time and motion this one little step saves is enormous, given today's processing volumes of over 20 million DVD returns every month. 28 (A link to a gallery illustrating the evolution of the Netflix envelope is available online at http://money.cnn.com/2006/04/20/ technology/business2_netflixgallery/index.htm.) 29 Although Cook described the current envelope as "perfect," Netflix's operational model depended on its ability to continue to conform to post-office operations and DVD technology. For example, new HD-DVD or Blu-ray discs might turn out to be too fragile for the current envelope, requiring more padding, which would increase postage costs dramatically. Other changes in post office equipment or requirements would require Netflix to adapt its procedures and design.
Adapting to the Studios
Netflix success also depended on its ability to interact with the producers of the content contained on DVDs: the movie and television studios. As a new medium, DVDs had offered Netflix a window of opportunity. Prior to the introduction of DVDs, movie studios had negotiated exclusivity contracts with premium cable channels to gain financing for new films. The contracts delayed the general availability of movies through subscription services, but the contracts did not cover DVDs, so Netflix was able to rent out new titles before they were available on premium cable channels.
Netflix negotiated revenue-sharing agreements with the studios, with studios providing Netflix with DVDs for new titles at cost, in exchange for a share of subscription revenues. 30 This approach reduced inventory costs appreciably. (Blockbuster had pioneered revenue sharing for VHS, but had not made a similar arrangement for DVDs.
)
The Netflix annual report Form 10(k) described the revenue sharing as follows:
"These revenue sharing agreements generally have terms of up to five years. Revenue share agreements typically enable us to increase our copy depth of DVDs on an economical basis because of the low initial payment. Additional payments are made only if our subscribers rent the DVD. Under a purchase arrangement, we must pay the full wholesale price, regardless of whether the DVD is rented. In addition, revenue sharing agreements generally provide for studio promotional support of the associated DVD and our service as well as permit us to own the DVD following expiration of the revenue sharing period, typically no more than 12 months following street date." 32 To have most titles immediately available to subscribers, Netflix purchased multiple copies of titles, based on a title's expected popularity, as predicted by comparing the new title to existing titles in its customer rating software. In a 2003 interview, Ted Sarandos, Chief Content Officer at Netflix, described the range of holdings. In that year, Netflix had bought 60,000 copies of My Big Fat Greek Wedding, as well as a few hundred copies of an independent title from a director just out of film school. 33 Sarandos looked beyond the big studios, to film festivals and boutique films, for new offerings. The company also resolved the number of copies to purchase as a software challenge. It recreated algorithms that looked at box-office results and rentals for similar movies, as well specific indicators such as the number of subscribers listing a movie on rental queues before the title was available on DVD. Other movies, such as Hotel Rwanda, with limited initial box-office appeal, had become top rentals on the Netflix system, primarily through the recommendation system. 34 Documentaries, which traditionally had limited box office appeal, found new life on Netflix. Netflix also began Red Envelope, an independent movie distribution and production company supporting small films.
Netflix's sharing contracts and other arrangements with studios depended on its negotiating success and the studios' willingness to allow companies like Netflix to have the opportunity for rental and sales. The studios' control of timing and pricing made Netflix dependent on its ability to adapt. Netflix's own entry into film development exposed it to a much riskier world, with a more volatile income stream.
Demand Creation: The Netflix User Experience
Customers made their movie selections on Netflix's website. According to Jim Cook, Netflix initially had leaned heavily on Amazon's web design:
Why reinvent the wheel if someone has already come up with an easy-to-use, useful, and elegant solution? When designing the Netflix website, we turned to the best: Amazon. Some of the ideas that we adapted: product and button placements; overall color schemes; size of DVD images for fast page loading; customer reviews and movie reviewer articles; easy-to-use search with categorized searching by movie genre; overall website navigation." 35 Netflix added to this mix its movie queue and its recommendation system. In May 2003, Netflix filed a patent application for its "approach to renting items for customers." 36 In April 2006, the same day the patent was issued, Netflix sued Blockbuster's new online rental program for infringement of its patents, particularly for the method of prioritizing and ordering from the queue. Blockbuster announced it would contest the suit. 37 Netflix used its online recommendation system to help customers build their queues and to stimulate customer demand for titles outside the most recent releases. Customers received individualized recommendations for titles, based on their ratings of movies they had already seen. To the extent that Netflix could move customers out of recent releases and into titles that were requested less frequently, it could maximize the use of its inventory and reduce the number of copies it needed of new releases.
Netflix's recommendation engine, CineMatch, was built on an Oracle database, and included over a billion ratings, with two million additional ratings added every day. The proprietary software organized the Netflix library into clusters of similar movies, and then analyzed how customers rated them. Those who had given similar ratings to the same movies in a cluster were then matched as like-minded viewers. Then CineMatch looked in real time at an individual subscriber's ratings and recommended films that had been highly rated by matched viewers. 38 In 2006, Netflix launched a highly publicized contest with a million dollar prize for new software that could improve the accuracy of CineMatch's customer recommendations by 10 percent. It posted interim results on its website; by January 2007, top teams of software developers worldwide had entered, and the top entries had found ways to improve matches by over 7 percent.
Netflix continued to develop additional customer experiences for its website to widen the list of movies that subscribers might consider adding to their online queues. For example, through a "Friends" page, subscribers shared their lists and recommendations with others. Subscribers were also offered lists of the top 100 rentals, and the top rentals in a subscriber's local zip code.
By mid-2006, Netflix subscribers were renting 35,000 to 40,000 different titles every day, and two-thirds of its rentals were from the company's backlist, rather than recently released films. 39 Increasing backlist rentals increased customer satisfaction with the rental experience and allowed Netflix to reduce its inventory of new releases and thus avoid the revenue-sharing payments that recent releases required. 40 As Sarandos noted in a 2006 interview, If you're in the hits fulfillment business, the top 10 movies of the year, like Blockbuster and most people are, the margin pressure is enormous…. We are completely upsidedown from that, so 70 percent of what we ship is deep catalog, and 30 percent new releases…. There's a lot better margin in demand creation than in demand fulfillment. 41 While Netflix's web design enchanted customers, the company's advantage was not necessarily sustainable. Amazon, which was also highly rated by consumers, had a service in the United Kingdom, DVD "Rental by Post," which was similar to Netflix. Amazon had never brought that service to the United States, but that strategy could change.
Throttling Customer Demand -Too Much of a Good Thing?
Fast turnaround was both a key -and a challenge -to Netflix's success. Customer satisfaction depended on Netflix's ability to send out movies within one or two days of receiving a return. However, Netflix found that some customers were very heavy users of the system, turning over their rentals almost right away. The most common plan was three movies at a time for $17/month, with free shipping; the average subscriber rented two to 11 DVDs per month, With round-trip costs approaching $0.85 to $1.00 per rental and round-trip postage alone roughly $0.68, a subscriber under that plan renting more than 17 or 20 movies a month would cost Netflix money.
Some customers who were heavy users of the system found their accounts "throttled," or in Netflix terms "smoothed," by receiving DVDs from centers that were two shipping days away instead of one, and other unexplained delays. 42 One Netflix settled the suit in October 2005, without admitting wrongdoing or apparently changing its service. The settlement gave all subscribers a one-month free upgrade to the next highest level of service, paid Chavez $2,000, and covered legal fees and costs of around $2.5 million. 44 In January 2006, the company did change its "terms of service" agreement with customers to acknowledge that those renting fewer titles get faster service and titles higher in their queue. (See Exhibit 4 for the resulting terms of service from Netflix's website.) While Netflix retained the right to provide slower delivery to more frequent users, the policy seemed to create a penalty for those who most enjoyed the service that the company offered. Some analysts and a number of bloggers argued that this policy could create friction with loyal customers. On the other hand, alternative solutions, such as setting a maximum number of rentals per month, might interfere with marketing efforts to the majority of potential subscribers, who were not likely to have such heavy usage patterns.
In-Store AND Online Rental: The Blockbuster Challenge
Netflix had overcome several challenges to its leadership in DVD rentals. At first, the company had had to overcome consumer reluctance to wait a few days to get a movie rather than grab one immediately from a local store. As Netflix grew its online rental business, competitors entered the market. In 2002, Wal-Mart began an online rental service, but by 2005, Netflix had driven it out of the DVD rental business.
But by January 2007, Netflix faced a revamped threat from Blockbuster, which had developed a new rental service that combined online rental with in-store renewal. In 2005, Blockbuster, the largest brick-and-mortar video rental company, had eliminated late fees in most of its stores, and at the end of 2006 it created "Total Access Service," combining online and in-store rentals, and began a major push to ramp up its online customer base.
Blockbuster itself was in trouble. With the market shift to DVDs, the availability of DVDs through the mail, and the low price of DVD purchases, Blockbuster's stores had become a liability. At the end of 2003, it had 5,670 stores (4,579 owned by Blockbuster, and 1,091 under franchise agreements). By 2006 it had reduced the number of U.S. stores to 4,000 and had announced a plan to continue to reduce stores by around 800 a year as leases expired. 45 Netflix rentals had cut into Blockbuster's in-store rental volume, and eliminating late fees had cut into Blockbuster revenues. 46 In retrospect, Blockbuster had made a number of strategic mistakes. In 1998 it had refused to accept Warner Bros.'s offer to entrench a DVD rental window under a shared-revenue program (the same program that Netflix later negotiated). Then Blockbuster turned down an opportunity to purchase Netflix for $50 million. By 2006, the company Sumner Redstone of Viacom had bought in 1994 for $8.4 billion had a market value of under $700 million. 47 (Exhibit 5 shows Blockbuster financials and stock price.)
By the end of 2006, Blockbuster owned a library of 65,000 titles for its online service and added 30 regional mail centers in addition to its central warehouse in Texas. It initially created a completely separate inventory system for its online service, locating discs in mail centers rather than having the central warehouse provide discs for stores. 48 After starting its new offering with one free monthly in-store rental, Blockbuster added several twists: It allowed customers to return a mailed title to a local store, giving customers both faster mail-out of the next title from their queue as well as an immediate, free store replacement (under rental-store rules). "Frequently asked questions" on Blockbuster's website suggested that it was having trouble with DVD breakage during mailing. In addition, the company's website was not as easy to navigate nor as informative as Netflix's. However, the company's ability to provide DVDs instantly to subscribers willing to visit a store did offer an advantage over Netflix.
Blockbuster had announced that as part of its new service it expected to reduce the number of stores and reduce the number of titles carried in each of the remaining stores in order to emphasize "hot new titles and high-value promotional movies" for in-store rentals. It also planned to use the 1,000 largest stores as mail centers for the online rental service, to provide faster turnaround times. 49 With a greatly increased advertising budget, Blockbuster promoted its combined service by promising instant gratification (you would always have a movie to watch), and no throttling ("we will never slow you down"). By the end of 2006, it had grown its online customer base to 2.3 million subscribers, 2 million of them paying. Although some analysts were still predicting Blockbuster's demise, others saw it surviving to rival, if not kill, Netflix's service. 50 Blockbuster's own online service put additional pressure on profitability of its U.S. stores, and it was not clear whether its own brick-and-mortar stores could withstand the challenge of online service from both Netflix and Blockbuster itself. As for the impact on Netflix, although Reed Hastings did not describe the Blockbuster challenge as a serious threat, he acknowledged that the new service creating a "headwind" for Netflix. 51 Netflix's customer growth was slower in 2006 than it had been in prior years, and the company had increased its spending on advertising.
Delivering Movies, not DVDs: the VoD Challenge
Although Netflix used online ordering and communication, its rental service was, in the end, the round-trip delivery of a physical object through the U.S. Postal Service. For years, technologists had been predicting that video-on-demand services would be available in homes "just a few years down the road." At some point that forecast might finally come true for more than just a few, specialized services. Many believed VoD would cause the market for DVD rentals and purchases to collapse. VoD would end the reliance on moving a physical object, would be available immediately, and would avoid Netflix's major expenses of postage and handling. However, true VoD over the internet faced a number of unresolved problems. As of 2007, no technology offered an easy interface between computers and televisions. Downloads were timeconsuming, particularly as high-definition products with large files came on the market. The February 2007 Consumer Reports noted that a typical five-gigabyte, high-definition movie would take 9 hours with low-speed DSL, 2.8 hours with cable, and 17 minutes with a fiber connection. 52 In addition, studios were reluctant to make digital versions of movies readily available. They were fearful of pirating and the loss of copy protection. Yet another limitation to the growth of VoD had been the studio contracts with premium television channels, which provided the channels with exclusive digital rights for defined periods. 53 By 2006, on-demand video encompassed a wide range of quality and availability. True VoD was available in some hotels and via limited online offerings. Cable service offered "near" on-demand service -titles were broadcast every 20 minutes, so customers could watch at any time, but titles were limited. Comcast, for example, offered only 800 movies. Video, although at a lower quality, was available through iTunes, telephones and YouTube.
Netflix launched View Now in mid-January 2007 for the first wave of subscribers, and it expected to make the service available to all subscribers by the end of June. About 1,000 films and televisions shows were available for watching at the launch of the service, and the library was expected to reach 5,000 films by the end of 2007. To use the new feature, subscribers would be required to accept a one-time download of a browser applet, which would enable a movie to play on their computers within 10 to 15 seconds. Subscribers with a 3Mbps broadband connection would have DVD-quality viewing on their computer, and those with slower broadband speeds could still use the service. 54 The movies streamed to computers with Windows software, and were not available on Apple computers or other operating systems. In addition, the movie had to be watched on the computer, with no easy access to home television sets.
Netflix was using its own servers, locating them across the country. It streamed movies to the subscriber's computer, beginning immediately after the subscriber clicked "play." The number of hours available corresponded to a subscriber's monthly subscription plan. Subscribers at the $5.99 per month level would be able to see six hours of video or TV shows monthly, and those paying $17.99 would receive 18 hours each month. The amount delivered was measured by time, not the total length of any title, so that subscribers could use their time to browse through many titles, watching only a few minutes of each, or only particular scenes, or only the beginning, or the end.
Netflix announced that it was spending $40 million in 2007 for the development of online video, and in January 2007 increased the estimate to "more than" $40 million, as some analysts argued that $40 million was an unrealistically low forecast of first-year costs. Although Netflix declined to provide a breakdown of costs, observers suggested that securing rights was the largest portion of the spending, since hardware prices were low. 55 Netflix had negotiated arrangements with NBC Universal, Sony Pictures, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc, 20th Century Fox, Paramount Pictures, Warner Bros., Lionsgate, New Line Cinema, and a number of television studios, but a few studios such as Disney had not yet agreed to offer its movies. 56 As he announced the new service, Reed Hastings made it clear that he did not expect the streaming service to be more than a "microscopic" portion of Netflix's movie delivery for the immediate future. He believed that the website customer experience would keep Netflix in the market even as VoD grew, but, he stated, "DVD is going to be a very big market for a very long time." 57 Hastings predicted that online video would develop over time into three separate markets: first, advertising-supported video, with sellers like YouTube and Yahoo; second, download for purchase, dominated by companies like Apple, Amazon, and Wal-Mart; and third, video rental, which he saw as Netflix's expertise. (The Wal-Mart announcement on February 6, 2007, of a test version of its new download-to-sale service of new titles at retail rates, offering movies as well as television shows, seemed to confirm Hastings' assessment.)
Hastings stated that streaming service was a first step in this evolving market area. With no way to predict consumer demand for the product, this first step would provide Netflix with more data to evaluate which of its subscribers were interested in this service and how powerful a draw it would prove to be. If the service turned out to be popular, it could replace rentals through the mail, particularly for the latest titles, eliminating postage and handling costs. In addition, although the company did not say so explicitly, the service provided a key competitive advantage. It provided instant gratification -a movie now -without even a drive to the rental store. On the other hand, Netflix's service was limited to streaming video, not a downloadable file that the customer could keep or play on another device. Whether customers would be satisfied with online rental at this level, rather than purchase, remained to be seen.
Netflix had succeeded by adapting to its suppliers, its delivery system, and its customers. It now had to look for ways to adapt to new competitors and technology. Would the operational excellence that had driven their early success allow it to meet these new challenges? Or, as so many companies before them, would they fade away as their niche disappeared? 
Exhibit 4: Netflix Terms of Use: Allocation, Delivery and Return of Rented DVDs
We reserve the right to process orders and otherwise allocate and ship DVDs among our subscribers in any manner that we, in our sole and absolute discretion, determine. In addition, we will, in our sole and absolute discretion, determine the quantity of DVDs we purchase for any particular title, their location within our distribution network and the level of staffing and number of shipments to be processed at each distribution center. As a result of the operational practices described in this section, we may not always send you the top choices from your queue, ship out your next DVD on the same day that we receive one from you, or process orders from your local distribution center.
At present, our goal is to ship you the DVDs listed highest in your queue. We currently try to ship you DVDs from the distribution center closest to you so that you get movies quickly. Generally, on the same day that we receive a DVD from you, we will ship the next available DVD from your queue. In certain instances, your next available DVD will not ship until at least one business day following our receipt of your returned movie. This can occur, for example, when your top choices are not available to you from your closest distribution center or the number of shipments to be processed by the distribution center on that day has been exceeded. When one or both of these conditions exist, your DVD will likely ship on the next business day and may come from an alternate distribution center.
In determining priority for shipping and inventory allocation, we may utilize many different factors, including without limitation, the number and type of DVDs you rent through our service, the subscription plan you select, as well as other uses of our service by you. For example, if all other factors are the same, we give priority to those members who receive the fewest DVDs through our service. The type, number, mix and weighting of the various factors impacting shipping and inventory allocation will change from time to time and will be made in our sole and absolute discretion. As a result of your viewing habits and our operational practices, the actual number of DVDs you rent in any month may vary, and you may experience differentiated service during the course of your membership. Also, such service may be different from the service we provide to other members on the same membership plan. The type of differentiated service you may experience includes, without limitation, (i) the shipment of your next available DVD occurring at least one business day following return of your previously viewed movie, (ii) delivery taking longer, as the shipments may not be sent from your local distribution center and (iii) the movies you receive coming from lower in your queue more often than our other subscribers. These effects will not occur unless we are faced with limited inventory at your local distribution center or when the number of shipments to be processed by that distribution center on that day is exceeded. In our unlimited plans, we do not establish a monthly limit on the number of DVDs you can rent.
Other factors that may affect delivery times, include, but are not limited to, (i) the distance between the distribution center from which your DVD was shipped and your delivery address, (ii) the timing of your placement or adjustment of movies in your queue, (iii) circumstances impacting delivery by the U.S. Postal Service, and (iv) any unplanned downtime of our computer systems.
We receive mail from the USPS and process returns Monday through Friday, except Holidays. Generally all of the returns are processed on the same day received. We will send an email to you soon after processing your return, and another email letting you know when we have shipped your next DVD, including the anticipated day of delivery. We make no guaranty as to the shipping and delivery of DVDs and may, in our sole and absolute discretion, change our business practice regarding allocation, delivery and shipping, without notice. We may from time to time revise these Terms of Use but we will not necessarily provide you notice of the revisions. It is up to you to review the Terms of Use frequently to determine if there have been changes. We believe that our operational practices, including how we prioritize shipping and inventory allocation among our subscribers, provide a great value to all our subscribers. 
